1. Introduction

The global climate governance architecture is presently at an important point of decision-making. The split of responsibility for emission reductions from developed and developing countries is still highly debated with COP30 taking place in 2025. One of the more unexpected but important players in this debate will be BRICS, or the grouping of major emerging economies. Initially established as an investment group in 2001 and later turned into a diplomatic platform in 2009, BRICS has broadened its mandate beyond just economic cooperation to also include environmental sustainability as a key area of joint action [2]. The significance of BRICS in the context of international climate change is immense given that BRICS countries currently produce and consume approximately 50% of the world’s total energy, emit about 40% of the world’s total greenhouse gases and comprises approximately 1/3 of the earth’s landmass [1,2]. Furthermore, when measured by purchasing power parity BRICS countries represent a larger percentage (by GDP) of world total than do the G7 countries; a benchmark that has tremendous value in international climate negotiations, where a country’s GDP is both a measure of its ability to take action and an indicator of its historical liability for emissions produced.[7]

While the group's climate profile is a paradox; there are countries that have raised usage by millions through carbon-based industrial development while combining them with some of the most ambitious renewable energy targets and ongoing development of coal infrastructure, have multilateral climate principles of development while at the same time dealing with extreme domestic energy sources. In the words of an observer, "Some countries have the best practices related to renewables whereas others have the greatest availability of fossil-based fuel and the technology to capture, store and utilize carbon" [1]. The question is whether this diversity is a liability (by fracturing collective action) or a strategic asset (by providing tailored solutions for local conditions).

The paper will follow the methodology outlined below: Section Two will address the theoretical foundation for this analysis (Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) guidelines and Poly-Centric Governance Theory); Section Three will assess how

(1) environmental performance – reducing emissions, improving resource efficiency, protecting biodiversity; (2) social responsibility – principles of a just transition to a low-carbon economy, the impacts of the transition on communities and consideration of equity; and (3) governance – the extent to which policies are coherent and well-developed, the capacity of institutions, and the availability of mechanisms to ensure transparency [4].

The ESG (environmental, social, and governance) framework is important to BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries because it explicitly identifies tradeoffs. For instance, a country pursuing a heavy reduction in carbon (greenhouse gas) emissions without taking into account social impacts (for example, disruption of livelihoods for people and communities depending on coal production) will be rated poorly on the social dimension, despite improvements in environmental performance. Therefore, when it comes to climate finance allocation, governance transparency becomes increasingly important given the significant amounts of money that will be needed for these types of investments. As a result, the ESG framework captures the unjust transition principle that BRICS ministers have often highlighted, which states that "an unjust transition should not only consider the economic reality of all nations" [5].

2.2 Polycentric Governance and South-South Cooperation

Conventional understanding of climate governance has mostly used state led, top-down systems, as can be seen in binding targets set by the Kyoto Protocol as part of the climate regime. However, Bulkeley and Newell have identified a movement towards polycentric governance where multiple, interconnected centres of power are involved in governance across multiple levels (often characterized as institutional) outside of the formal treaty structures. BRICS represents this growing trend towards polycentricity; the environmental cooperation occurring among member states is accomplished through model-specific mechanisms (e.g. ministerial meetings, working groups, New Development Bank, research networks, and other informal diplomatic channels). This form of cooperative environmental governance allows for a greater level of flexibility than what can be provided through singular treaty-based governance.

However, more operationally significant than the joint declarations by leaders is the BRICS Energy Cooperation Roadmap 2025-2030, which was approved by BRICS Energy Ministers at their ministerial meeting in May 2025 under Brazil's presidency. The roadmap identified five-year priorities for cooperation related to energy; the priorities are to align regulations across all BRICS member countries, obtain low-interest financing for energy transitions and use local currencies for energy trade in order to reduce FX risk [1]. By establishing timelines and deliverables, the Energy Cooperation Roadmap 2025-2030 moves BRICS beyond aspirational declarations toward coordinated actions.

3.2 Operational Implementation: Technical Platforms and Working Groups

BRICS has established a number of dedicated technical platforms for industrial modernization issues. Created to "enhance the institutional framework for technical cooperation and develop normative guidance documents on developing new joint initiatives," the Energy Research Cooperation Platform (BRICS ERCP) is one way that BRICS has done this [1]. In the same vein, the Partnership for Urban Environmental Sustainability, the Clean Rivers Program (June 2022), and the BRICS Centre for Industrial Competence (being launched in partnership with UNIDO), also fulfil the same objective regarding addressing sectoral sustainability challenges [5,8].

In addition, BRICS's formation of working groups focusing on Smart Manufacturing and Robotics, Digital Transformation of Industry, and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), demonstrates the fact that BRICS recognizes the integration between sustainable development and industrial modernization efforts. SMEs represent "90% of companies and just over 50% of jobs in the BRICS member states," and their transition to low carbon operations will require focused policy attention [8].

3.3 The New Development Bank as Green Financial Institution

The New Development Bank (NDB), founded by the BRICS nations in 2014, has emerged as the most material institutional innovation of BRICS for financing sustainability.

4. National Strategies: Divergent Pathways to Net-Zero

Table 1 summarises the major commitments by various countries within BRICS and the major challenges they are facing as a result of their specific fossil fuel endowments and the national political economy at different stages of development. Developing significant collective institutions as BRICS has done, but having such differing national political economies, has led to separate country transition pathways.

Table 1: BRICS National Climate Commitments and Energy Profiles

Sources:Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2025)

4.1 China: Scale Leader with Coal Dependency

China is arguably the most significant paradox for global climate governance. As the world’s largest installer of both solar and wind capacity, China is responsible for about 50% of the global deployment of both technologies in recent years. China is also the manufacturer of about 90% of all solar panels and EV batteries. At the same time, however, approximately 55% of China's electricity generation comes from coal, and the Government has recently approved the construction of new coal-fired power plants, even while expanding renewable energy sources.

This inconsistency stems in part from China’s need for a stable, reliable base load supply that is a 24/7 service provided by traditional electrical generation or coal. Currently, battery storage is not able to provide 100% of that service but will provide progressively more of it over time as renewable sources of electrical energy become more prevalent.

4.3 Brazil: Renewables Rich, Land Use Challenged

Brazil has a relatively clean energy mix, with approximately 60% of the country's electricity being generated from hydropower and a significant portion of its transportation sector relying on biofuels. The primary climate issue facing Brazil is related to land-use change rather than energy-use change; the deforestation of the Amazon rainforest has shifted the country from being considered a net carbon sink (emission absorbing) to becoming a source of net carbon emissions. Therefore, Brazil’s climate strategy must combine its environmental policy with its agriculture and land use governance.

With Brazil taking leadership of BRICS in 2025, it has highlighted the need for a “just and financially feasible energy transition,” focusing on ensuring that the costs associated with the energy transition do not fall disproportionately on developing countries [1]. Additionally, Cop30, which will be held in Belém in November 2025, has been positioned as an opportunity to renew ambition and hold developed countries accountable for financing commitments.

4.4 Russia: The Fossil Fuel Incumbent

Russia's long-term goal is to achieve a net-zero economy by 2060, the country continues to prioritize natural gas as its "transition fuel"; this can be challenged by environmental advocacy groups, while also taking into consideration natural gas being cleaner-burning than coal. Russia has also increasingly invested in nuclear power as well as carbon capture and storage technologies.

Russia's role within BRICS is delicate. Joint statements issued by the BRICS bloc, such as the May 2025 Energy Statement, were developed with care to "respect national contexts and priorities" that allow for a variety of transition timelines [1]. The BRICS label serves as an avenue for cooperating with one another on climate issues without being pressured by the political climates in Western-dominated organizations.

4.5 South Africa: Coal Dependence and Just Transition

Among all BRICS countries, South Africa faces the greatest challenge in achieving its just transition. Currently, about 85% of electricity consumed in South Africa is generated from coal, which employs

in climate-related developments and/or transition activities in the energy system. Third, there is a significant delay in the overall approval process for many current climate financing applications relative to the urgency of reducing emissions in the future.

BRICS climate finance proposed an agenda of five pillars, such as scaling up BRICS institutions' financing, increasing South-South cooperation, improving the ability to withstand systematic shocks, advocating for the reform of international financial institutions, and changing finance from being a regulatory tool to becoming a tool to promote development [9]. Implicitly, this portrays a critique of the current financial system since many forms of financing include conditionalities (policies) which do not align with a recipient country’s developmental priorities.

5.2 Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property

Barrier number two relates to access to technology. Despite the BRICS countries progressing in deploying renewable energy options, some of the most essential technologies (especially as they relate to hard-to-abate areas such as steel, cement and chemicals) are still held in developed nations. While the Paris Agreement contains commitments to facilitate the transfer of technologies, the application has been limited because of the presence of commercial interests and intellectual property rights in place.

The emergence of China as a clean technology manufacturer somewhat lessens this barrier for the rest of the BRICS nations. However, there are many unknowns around technology transfer between the BRICS nations. For example, how freely will the Chinese solar panels and batteries come to BRICS countries, or will they be subject to market-based pricing that some BRICS countries cannot afford? Similarly, will the manufacturing capabilities be created across BRICS nations, or will China remain as the only country producing these technologies? There are no concrete answers to these questions yet.

5.3 Political Economy Tensions: Coal, Growth, and Energy Security

The third barrier of an energy transition is structural and, thus, a political economy that always has losers.

The Energy Cooperation Roadmap for the period from 2025-2030 provides an important starting point that can be used to develop measurable indicators that account for this heterogeneity in the BRICS response to Climate Change.

6.2 Make the NDB "Green" Capitalized

To carry out its purpose as a Green Bank, the New Development Bank must grow its lending capacity (its capital) and also increase its Green Loan portfolio. This can happen through prioritizing: 1) developing green bonds in local currencies to hedge against foreign exchange volatility associated with borrowing; 2) expediting the processing of applications for financing of renewable energy projects; and 3) providing technical assistance in implementing projects supported by it through creating lines of credit that include financing and implementation assistance. The NDB's governance model is equally owned and governed by each member nation; this provides it with international legitimacy that is lacking at other multilateral development institutions that are dominated by Western countries. The NDB should leverage this political capital.

6.3 Establish a BRICS Technology Sharing Mechanism

a BRICS Technology Sharing Mechanism in order to overcome barriers to technology transfer. The purpose of establishing such a mechanism is to allow for voluntary sharing of clean energy technologies based on the models established in the public health area (i.e., the Medicines Patent Pool) and the climate area (i.e., the technology transfer provisions of the Montreal Protocol) for the purpose of enabling affordable access to patented technologies while providing the owners (i.e., rights holders) opportunity to be compensated for their inventions; there is no better example of how a mechanism such as this can demonstrate the value of genuine South-South cooperation than China’s technological advantage.

6.4 Link Industrial and Climate Policy Explicitly

BRICS should also link Industrial Policy to Climate Policy More Directly. With the establishment of working groups for smart manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), an opening exists to embed climate considerations into the industrial policy wine.

technical platforms and financing mechanisms), differentiated accountability (i.e., recognising differing national paths to transition) and an explicit just transition framework, may provide a model for reconciling development and decarbonisation goals. The institutional arrangements of the BRICS, notably through the New Development Bank and the Energy Cooperation Roadmap, create pathways to operationalise their cooperation towards this end beyond using policy declarations as the vehicle for cooperation.

Despite this progress, there are serious challenges still ahead. The climate finance gap is large enough to make it almost impossible to achieve the climate targets that have been set at the international level. There are far too few technology transfer mechanisms in place than there should be in order meet the demand for them by both developed and developing countries. The expansion of BRICS, which now includes some of the world's fossil-fuel dependent countries, has raised serious questions about the internal tensions within BRICS and how those tensions may affect the ability of BRICS to act as a coherent bloc in the area of climate policy. Also, the continuing tension between the imperative for energy security (which may favour fossil fuels in certain contexts) and the imperative to decarbonise (which means phasing out fossil fuels) is an ongoing source of contention within BRICS.

Ultimately, the significance of BRICs for the broader context of global climate governance will depend on whether, as a bloc, it will be able to demonstrate that emissions reductions and economic growth can be achieved simultaneously—not merely by making incremental improvements in efficiency, but by fundamentally transforming the energy and industrial systems that drive economic growth. If BRICs can successfully demonstrate that emissions reductions and economic growth can be achieved at the same time, it will also demonstrate that the frequently asserted trade-off between climate action and development is untrue. Conversely, if BRICs fails to meet this expectation, the damage done to global emissions trajectories, and to the billions of people living in developing countries who look to BRICs as models for their own economic development, will be immense.

8. Kılıç E. (2025). BRICS expansion: Economic and financial cooperation. Sustainable Development Goals Series, 431-477. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-6986-8_20 [Article]