

Effectiveness of the Constituency Development Fund Accountability Framework in Service Delivery: Evidence from Chawama and Kanyama Constituencies, Lusaka, Zambia

Chambaka A^{1*}, Mutono- Mwanza BG²


DOI:10.54741/MJAR/6.2.2026.303

^{1*} Angela Chambaka, Graduate School of Business, The University of Zambia, Zambia.

² Bupe Getrude Mutono- Mwanza, Graduate School of Business, The University of Zambia, Zambia.

The Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Zambia has become a central fiscal decentralization tool aimed at fostering inclusive development and improve service delivery at the constituency level. This study assessed the effectiveness of the CDF accountability framework on service delivery in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies of Lusaka, Zambia. Specifically, it examined stakeholders' perceptions of key accountability elements, assessed the effectiveness of accountability elements on service delivery and critically analysed challenges affecting CDF accountability. Employing a convergent parallel mixed methods design, the study integrated quantitative data from structured questionnaires administered to 193 stratified random respondents (144 returned; 75% response rate) with qualitative insights from 18 purposively selected informants, including CDF Committee members, Ward Development Committees, council officers, and community representatives. Reliability and validity were ensured through pre-testing, triangulation and consistency in checks. Quantitative data were analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics in SPSS, while qualitative data were analysed thematically. Findings reveal that transparency, financial management and M&E significantly influence service delivery, with financial management emerging as the most critical driver of service delivery outcomes. However, the full realization of the fund's developmental impact is constrained by political interference, limited technical capacity, inadequate financial reporting, bureaucratic delays, weak monitoring systems, and restricted information disclosure. The study concludes that while the CDF accountability framework in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies is structurally well-established, its effectiveness in improving service delivery is constrained by weak enforcement, limited capacity, and operational inefficiencies. The study stresses the necessity of strengthening transparency, building CDF committee capacity, financial management through results based financing linked to verified outputs. It further underscores the need for stronger monitoring and evaluation and enforcing independent audits to ensure compliance and improve the effectiveness of service delivery.

Keywords: effectiveness, constituency development fund, accountability framework, financial management, transparency, monitoring & evaluation service delivery

Corresponding Author	How to Cite this Article	To Browse
Angela Chambaka, Graduate School of Business, The University of Zambia, Zambia. Email: angela.mazuba@gmail.com	Chambaka A, Mutono- Mwanza BG, Effectiveness of the Constituency Development Fund Accountability Framework in Service Delivery: Evidence from Chawama and Kanyama Constituencies, Lusaka, Zambia. Manag J Adv Res. 2026;6(2):49-65. Available From https://mjar.singhpublication.com/index.php/ojs/article/view/303	

Manuscript Received 2026-03-11	Review Round 1 2026-03-28	Review Round 2	Review Round 3	Accepted 2026-04-17
Conflict of Interest None	Funding Nil	Ethical Approval Yes	Plagiarism X-checker 5.21	Note



1. Introduction

Accountability in the management of public resources is widely recognized as a cornerstone of good governance and sustainable socio-economic development. Globally, accountability frameworks are designed to ensure that public funds are allocated, utilized and monitored transparently and efficiently, while aligning expenditures with intended development outcomes (OECD, 2016; World Bank, 2021). In decentralized governance systems, accountability assumes even greater importance as fiscal authority is transferred closer to citizens. While decentralization can enhance responsiveness and improve service delivery, it also introduces risks of mismanagement where oversight mechanisms are weak (Bovens, 2007; UNDP, 2020). Effective accountability frameworks therefore integrate transparency, sound financial management, oversight structures and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems to strengthen public trust and improve development outcomes.

In this context, many developing countries have adopted decentralized financing mechanisms such as Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) to accelerate grassroots development and respond to local socio-economic needs. Evidence from countries such as Kenya, India and the Philippines suggests that while CDFs can promote community participation and enhance service delivery, their effectiveness is largely contingent on the strength of accountability systems and institutional capacity (Smoke, 2015; Wampler, 2022). However, persistent challenges including weak transparency, political interference and limited citizen participation often undermine their effectiveness and lead to inefficiencies and inequitable outcomes (Fox, 2022). Across sub-Saharan Africa, these challenges are further compounded by elite capture, weak oversight institutions and inadequate monitoring systems, creating a gap between formal accountability frameworks and actual practice (Ayee, 2020; Afrobarometer, 2022).

In Zambia, the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), introduced in 1995, represents a central pillar of fiscal decentralization aimed at promoting inclusive development, enhancing grassroots participation and improving service delivery. CDF has evolved significantly in both scope and quantum, increasing from modest amounts of K1.6m, in the early 2000s to K36.1 million per constituency by 2025.

This expansion is supported by a comprehensive legislative and policy framework, including the Public Finance Management Act (2018), the Local Government Act (2019) and the CDF Act (2018), alongside detailed implementation guidelines. Despite this robust framework, multiple reports by the Auditor General and Transparency International Zambia highlight persistent challenges such as underutilization of funds, weak monitoring systems, irregular disbursements and limited accountability (Auditor General of Zambia, 2023; TI-Z, 2025). In some cases, less than half of allocated funds are utilized for intended projects, raising concerns about institutional capacity and governance effectiveness.

These challenges are particularly evident in high-density urban constituencies such as Chawama and Kanyama in Lusaka. Characterized by rapid population growth, informal settlements and infrastructure deficits, these constituencies face significant development pressures. Although they have received substantial CDF allocations, audit findings point to issues such as delayed project implementation, weak oversight, misapplication of funds and inadequate monitoring. Such constraints limit the translation of financial resources into tangible service delivery outcomes. Against this backdrop, there is a critical need to assess how the CDF accountability framework functions in practice. This study therefore examines the effectiveness of transparency, financial management and M&E mechanisms in shaping service delivery outcomes, with a view to generating empirical evidence and informing policy interventions aimed at strengthening accountability and enhancing grassroots development.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Despite the Zambian government's substantial increase in Constituency Development Fund (CDF) allocations from K1.6 million in 2021 to K36.1 million per constituency in 2025, the intended developmental outcomes remain elusive. Ideally, increased allocations should yield improved infrastructure, enhanced access to social services, expanded economic opportunities, and inclusive community development. In such a context, accountability mechanisms would ensure timely project implementation, prudent financial management, and meaningful citizen participation, thereby maximizing value for money and development impact.

However, absorption and utilization rates of CDF resources remain below expected performance thresholds. National budget performance reports consistently highlight persistent under-expenditure, with significant proportions of decentralized funds unutilized at the close of fiscal periods. The Auditor General reported absorption levels of less than 50% in 2023 and below 60% in 2024, with only 42% of funds allocated to community projects utilized in 2023 while 53% remained unspent. These figures reflect a clear divergence between established performance benchmarks—typically above 80%—and actual fund utilization outcomes.

Systemic weaknesses underpin this low absorption, including delayed procurement, poor project planning, weak monitoring, and inadequate financial documentation. Broader assessments further link these challenges to limited technical capacity, weak coordination, and governance constraints. Although policy guidelines and institutional structures exist to enhance accountability, enforcement remains inconsistent, particularly in high-density urban constituencies where demand for public services is greatest.

These challenges are evident in Lusaka Province, where Chawama and Kanyama constituencies rank among the worst-performing in fund utilization and accountability (Auditor General of Zambia, 2023). In Kanyama, more than K913,000 was disbursed to non-operational training institutions, while in Chawama irregular disbursements and prolonged delays persist. Documentation for 89 cooperatives that received K1.65 million was missing, undermining transparency and oversight. National reports also indicate cumulative losses exceeding ZMW254 million due to unrecovered empowerment funds (TI-Z, 2025)

On the ground, underutilization has translated into delayed or incomplete projects, limited access to essential services, and reduced economic empowerment opportunities. This mismatch between increased fiscal decentralization and actual development outcomes suggests that the core problem extends beyond funding levels to deficiencies in accountability frameworks governing CDF implementation. If these challenges persist, they risk eroding public trust, weakening decentralization reforms, and compromising Zambia's Vision 2030 development agenda (TI-Z, 2025; Afrobarometer, 2022).

Although decentralization and public financial management have been studied, limited empirical evidence exists on how accountability frameworks specifically influence CDF absorption, utilization, and service delivery outcomes at the constituency level. Few studies rigorously examine the combined effect of accountability mechanisms on service delivery in urban constituencies using evidence from both institutional actors and beneficiaries. This study therefore assesses the effectiveness of the CDF accountability framework in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies, examining how accountability mechanisms influence utilization and service delivery outcomes, while identifying factors contributing to low absorption rates and proposing measures to strengthen accountability and improve development outcomes.

1.3 Research Objectives

1. To examine stakeholders' perceptions on the key elements that constitute the accountability framework in the management of the Constituency Development Fund.
2. To assess the effectiveness of the accountability framework on service delivery in Constituency Development Fund.
3. To critically analyze the challenges affecting the management of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies.

1.4 Research Questions

1. What are stakeholders' perceptions of the key elements that constitute the accountability framework in the management of the CDF in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies?
2. How effective is the accountability framework on service delivery in CDF in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies?
3. What challenges affect the management of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies?

2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Public financial accountability in decentralized governance systems has become a central concern in development and public administration literature, particularly in developing countries where decentralization is expected to improve efficiency, responsiveness, and service delivery outcomes.

In theory, decentralization enhances local ownership, fosters equitable resource distribution and improve targeting of development priorities.

The CDF which was introduced in 1995 in Zambia represents a cornerstone fiscal decentralization instrument designed to transfer decision-making authority and development resources closer to communities. Over time, allocations have significantly increased both in scope and quantum, reflecting policy confidence in decentralized funding as a tool for improving service delivery. However, increased funding has not consistently translated into improved outcomes, largely due to weaknesses in accountability systems and implementation capacity (Muyaloka & Kachamba, 2024).

The theoretical foundation of CDF is rooted in decentralization and participatory governance frameworks, which posit that, devolving authority enhances accountability and development outcomes. While this assumption holds in principle, empirical evidence reveals that decentralization is not inherently effective. Its success is highly contingent on the strength of accountability frameworks such as institutional capacity, governance quality and enforcement of accountability mechanisms governing fund management (Keefer & Khemani, 2009, Smoke, 2015; Shah and Thompson, 2020). In Zambia, studies highlight persistent challenges such as elite capture, weak oversight and limited citizen participation, which constrain the effectiveness of decentralized funds (Matipa, 2019; Lubinga & Chibomba, 2026).

Despite widespread adoption of constituency-based development funds across developing contexts, there remains an ongoing tension between policy ambition and implementation reality. While decentralization is often framed as a mechanism for improving governance and service delivery, its effectiveness is increasingly questioned where institutional accountability systems are weak or inconsistently applied. This chapter critically reviews literature on accountability frameworks in CDF management, focusing on their key components, effectiveness, implementation challenges, and gaps in existing knowledge. The review is structured around the study objectives and provides the theoretical foundation for understanding how accountability mechanisms influence service delivery outcomes.

2.2 Empirical Review

2.2.1 RO1: Key elements that constitute the accountability framework in the management of CDF

Literature conceptualizes accountability frameworks as multidimensional systems encompassing legal, institutional, financial, and participatory components that collectively ensure responsible public resource management (Bovens et al., 2021; OECD, 2021). In Zambia, these components are formally institutionalized through the Constituency Development Fund Act No. 11 of 2018 and the Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 2018, which define governance structures, reporting obligations, and financial control mechanisms (GRZ, 2018).

However, while the formal architecture of accountability is well established, empirical studies reveal a persistent disconnect between design and practice. Institutional arrangements such as Constituency Development Fund Committees (CDFCs) and Ward Development Committees (WDCs) are intended to promote participatory governance and strengthen community oversight. Yet, in practice, their effectiveness is constrained by political interference, elite capture, and limited technical capacity (Mwansa and Phiri, 2023; Simutenda, 2023). This suggests that institutional presence does not necessarily translate into institutional effectiveness.

Similarly, transparency and financial reporting mechanisms, although formally embedded in the CDF framework, often function at a procedural level. Audit systems and disclosure requirements tend to emphasize compliance rather than ensuring accountability for development outcomes (Auditor General of Zambia, 2023). As a result, accountability is frequently reduced to reporting activities rather than ensuring effective use of public resources.

Stakeholder perspectives further reinforce this gap. While participation structures exist, communities often report limited influence over decision-making processes, raising concerns about the substantive value of participation in governance (Transparency International Zambia, 2022).

Overall, the literature indicates that Zambia's CDF accountability framework is structurally comprehensive but functionally constrained, with weak translation of formal mechanisms into meaningful governance outcomes.

2.2.2 RO2: Effectiveness of transparency, financial management, oversight, and monitoring and evaluation on service delivery

Transparency is widely recognized as the foundation of accountability because it reduces information asymmetry between government and citizens (Fox, 2020). In the Zambian CDF context, transparency mechanisms such as public disclosure of projects and budgets are formally required under policy guidelines (MLGRD, 2022). However, empirical evidence indicates that transparency remains largely superficial, with critical financial and performance information often incomplete or inaccessible to the public (Mulenga, 2023). This limits the capacity of citizens to engage meaningfully in oversight processes.

Financial management systems are expected to ensure efficient allocation, disbursement, and utilization of public resources. However, Auditor General reports consistently highlight systemic weaknesses, including delayed project implementation, unsupported expenditures, and inadequate financial documentation (Auditor General of Zambia, 2023). These weaknesses directly undermine the effectiveness of CDF-funded interventions and weaken service delivery outcomes.

Oversight mechanisms, including audit institutions and supervisory bodies, provide an essential layer of accountability. Nevertheless, their effectiveness is often constrained by their ex-post nature, meaning that they primarily detect rather than prevent mismanagement (OECD, 2021). This reactive orientation limits their ability to influence real-time decision-making and resource utilization.

Monitoring and evaluation systems are similarly constrained by inadequate technical capacity, weak data systems, and insufficient resources (Kusek and Rist, 2020). As a result, there is limited systematic tracking of project performance, making it difficult to assess whether CDF investments translate into tangible service delivery improvements.

A critical synthesis of the literature reveals that these accountability components are interdependent. Transparency without citizen capacity is ineffective; financial management without oversight increases vulnerability to misuse; and weak M&E systems limit learning and accountability feedback loops. However, existing studies tend to examine these elements in isolation, resulting in a fragmented understanding of their combined effect on service delivery outcomes.

2.2.3 RO3: Challenges affecting the management of the Constituency Development Fund

The literature identifies several interrelated challenges that undermine the effectiveness of CDF implementation. Political interference is consistently highlighted as a major constraint, where project selection and resource allocation are influenced by political considerations rather than community priorities (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2020). This compromises equity and weakens trust in governance systems.

Institutional capacity limitations further exacerbate implementation challenges. Local committees responsible for managing CDF projects often lack the technical expertise, financial skills, and logistical resources required for effective project planning and oversight (Smoke, 2021; UNDP, 2022). This results in inefficiencies, delays, and weak accountability enforcement.

Community participation, although formally embedded in the governance framework, is often limited in practice. Participation tends to be symbolic rather than substantive, with minimal influence on final decisions (Fox, 2020). This weakens downward accountability and reduces citizen trust in decentralized governance systems.

Financial management weaknesses, including poor procurement practices and weak record-keeping, further constrain effective implementation (Auditor General of Zambia, 2023). In addition, weak monitoring and evaluation systems limit the ability to track performance and enforce corrective action.

The literature also highlights socio-cultural constraints, including fear of authority and political affiliations, which discourage citizens from actively engaging in accountability processes.

Collectively, these challenges reinforce each other, creating systemic weaknesses that undermine the effectiveness of the CDF accountability framework.

2.2.4 Gaps in the Literature

Despite a growing body of literature on decentralization and public financial accountability, several critical gaps remain. First, much of the existing research is descriptive in nature, focusing on identifying accountability mechanisms rather than evaluating their effectiveness in improving service delivery outcomes. This limits deeper analytical understanding of performance dynamics within decentralized systems.

Second, accountability components such as transparency, financial management, oversight, and monitoring and evaluation are often studied in isolation. This fragmented approach fails to capture their interdependence and combined effect on service delivery performance.

Third, there is limited context-specific empirical research on urban constituencies in Zambia, despite their unique governance challenges arising from high population density, political competition, and socio-economic complexity. Most existing studies adopt national-level perspectives, leaving a gap in localized understanding of how accountability frameworks function in practice.

This study addresses these gaps by providing an integrated and context-specific analysis of how accountability mechanisms interact to influence service delivery outcomes in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies.

2.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks

2.3.1 Theoretical Frameworks

This study adopts a triple theoretical framework integrating Agency Theory, Governance Theory and Accountability Theory to analyze the effectiveness of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) accountability system. This multi-theoretical approach reflects the complex nature of decentralized public financial management, where outcomes are shaped by the interaction between individual incentives, institutional structures and performance systems. Evidence shows that the success of CDF initiatives depends not only on funding levels but also on the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms (Baskin, 2010; Muyaloka & Kachamba, 2024).

Agency Theory

Agency Theory explains accountability failures through the lens of principal-agent relationships, where citizens (principals) delegate authority to public officials (agents). Information asymmetry and divergent interests may result in self-serving behavior, misallocation of resources, and weak oversight (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the CDF context, this theory helps explain political interference and misuse of funds. Empirical studies confirm that political influence and elite capture often distort CDF implementation (Malik, 2021). However, the theory's focus on self-interest limits its ability to explain broader institutional dynamics

Governance Theory

Governance Theory addresses this gap by emphasizing institutional structures, transparency and participation as key to effective public resource management. It emphasizes transparency, participation, and institutional coordination as key determinants of effective service delivery (World Bank, 2023). Weak governance systems have been shown to undermine decentralized funds. It provides the broader institutional context within which CDF operates. The theory is often criticized for its normative orientation.

Accountability Theory

Accountability Theory provides the core analytical lens for this study by focusing on answerability, reporting, and enforcement mechanisms. It evaluates whether institutions ensure compliance with rules and responsiveness to public needs (Bovens et al., 2021). It directly informs the assessment of CDF accountability mechanisms. However, existing evidence suggests that accountability systems often prioritize compliance over outcomes (Akwalu & Muchai, 2020).

Together, these theories provide a complementary framework for analyzing behavioral, institutional, and procedural dimensions of accountability in decentralized governance systems.

2.3.2 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework is a product of a process of theorization which interlinks concept that together provides a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena (Jabareen, 2009). It outlines the relationships among concepts, variables, and ideas relevant to a given study.

In this study, the framework, positions CDF accountability as an independent variable comprising transparency, financial management and monitoring and evaluation systems. Collectively, these elements influence service delivery effectiveness, which serves as the dependent variable.

The framework illustrated in the table below, also recognizes moderating factors, including political will, and staff & stakeholder capacity. The interaction among these variables suggests that accountability is not determined by individual components alone but by the strength and coherence of the system as a whole.

2.3 Conceptual framework




Figure 1: Conceptual framework

Source: Researcher’s own concept, 2026

Transparency

Transparency, defined as the accessibility of information on public decisions and expenditures, is critical for enhancing citizen oversight and participation, yet evidence shows that limited disclosure and weak engagement constrain accountability in CDF systems (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 2016; Lubinga & Chibomba, 2026).

Financial management

Financial management practices encompassing budgeting, procurement, disbursement and reporting are equally central to ensuring efficient resource utilization. Studies on CDF implementation highlight persistent inefficiencies, including poor financial controls and underutilization of funds, which undermine development outcomes (Muyaloka & Kachamba, 2024; Baskin, 2010).

Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E)

Monitoring and Evaluation are vital for assessing the performance, relevance, and impact of development interventions.

Weak monitoring and evaluation systems limit the ability to track project performance and inform decision-making, leading to delays and incomplete projects (Hapompwe et al., 2020).

The framework further incorporates political will and staff and stakeholder capacity as moderating variables influencing these relationships. Strong political commitment and adequate technical capacity enhance accountability mechanisms, while their absence weakens implementation (Malik, 2021; Thomas & Makwai, 2022). Ultimately, effective service delivery reflected in timely, equitable and quality project outcomes depends on the interaction between these accountability elements and enabling contextual factors (Akwalu & Muchai, 2020; Kaira & Kajoba, 2025).

2.4 Conclusion

The literature demonstrates that while Zambia’s Constituency Development Fund is supported by a comprehensive accountability framework, significant gaps remain between policy design and practical implementation. Empirical evidence consistently shows that accountability mechanisms such as transparency, financial management, oversight, and monitoring systems are necessary but insufficient to guarantee effective service delivery.

The review further highlights that accountability challenges are deeply embedded in political, and institutional contexts which collectively weaken the functioning of decentralization systems. Additionally, existing studies remain fragmented and largely descriptive, with limited focus on integrated and context-specific analysis.

By addressing these gaps, this study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how accountability frameworks function in practice and how they influence service delivery outcomes in urban constituencies in Zambia. Top of Form Bottom of Form

3. Research Methods

3.1 Research Design and Approach

This study adopted a convergent parallel mixed-methods design to evaluate the effectiveness of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) accountability framework on service delivery in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies, Zambia.

The pragmatic paradigm guided the study, enabling methodological flexibility in examining both measurable accountability outcomes and stakeholder experiences. The study population comprised two categories: institutional actors (Members of Parliament, Ward Councillors, CDF Committee members and local authority officials from Lusaka City Council) and community stakeholders (beneficiaries and civil society representatives). This aligns with decentralised public finance literature emphasizing multi-actor accountability structures in constituency-level fund management (Baskin, 2010; Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 2016). A stratified random sampling technique was used for the quantitative component to ensure proportional representation across stakeholder categories, yielding a sample of 193 respondents from a population of 372, calculated using Yamane’s formula while purposive was used to select 18 key informants, determined through data saturation, with direct involvement in CDF financial governance and oversight functions. Data was collected through questionnaires and Key Informant Interview (KIIs). Quantitative data was analysed through SPSS while qualitative data was analysed thematically.

Instrument reliability was ensured through pre-testing and internal consistency checks while validity was achieved through alignment with established accountability constructs in public financial management literature. Methodological triangulation strengthened internal validity. Qualitative trustworthiness was ensured through credibility, dependability, confirmability and transferability supported by audit trails and verbatim evidence. Ethical clearance was obtained from the University of Zambia Ethical Committee. Informed consent was secured from all participants and participation was voluntary. Confidentiality was maintained through anonymization and secure data storage protocols, consistent with international standards for financial governance research ethics.

4. Results and Analysis

A total of 193 questionnaires were distributed, with 144 returned (response rate = 75%), indicating a robust dataset for analysis.

4.1 Objective 1: Stakeholders’ perceptions of accountability framework elements

Qualitative findings for Objective 1,

identified oversight structures, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, transparency, stakeholder engagement, and role distribution as core elements of the accountability framework as demonstrated in the table 1.

Table 1: Stakeholders’ perceptions of accountability framework elements

Stakeholder Perceptions (Findings)	Verbatim Evidence
Accountability Element: Oversight Structures	
KII perceived oversight committees as fundamental, but limited capacity and irregular convening weaken institutional oversight.	“We have oversight committees in place, but their activity is sometimes limited due to lack of capacity and resources... meetings are irregular and follow-ups are minimal.” (Informant 12)
Accountability Element: Financial Management	
Budgeting occurs at the start, but weak expenditure tracking, poor reporting, and inconsistent monitoring compromise fiscal discipline.	“Budgets are planned at the beginning... however, monitoring of actual spending is inconsistent.” (Informant 6)
Accountability Element: Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E),	
M&E systems are essential, but reporting is sporadic and rarely disseminated, restricting transparency and evidence use.	“M&E reports exist, but they are not regularly conducted or shared publicly.” (Informant 8)
Accountability Element: Transparency	
Transparency is seen as a cornerstone, yet reports are seldom shared in accessible formats, eroding public trust.	“Reports are prepared, but they are rarely shared with the community in a comprehensible manner.” (Informant 2)
Accountability Element Stakeholder Engagement	
Engagement is recognized as vital, but meetings are infrequent and poorly attended, limiting inclusivity and legitimacy.	“Community meetings are held occasionally... but attendance and participation are low.” (Informant 7)

Source: Research data, 2026

Qualitative findings identified six core elements of the accountability framework: oversight structures, financial management procedures, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), transparency mechanisms, stakeholder engagement, and distribution of roles. Although these elements are institutionally established, their operational effectiveness remains uneven. Stakeholders acknowledged the existence of oversight bodies (e.g., MPs, CDF Committees, WDCs, and council officials), but noted that their effectiveness is constrained by limited resources, irregular meetings, and weak coordination.

This reflects Accountability Theory, which emphasizes that formal structures alone are insufficient without effective enforcement and capacity.

Similarly, while budgeting processes are structured, expenditure monitoring was reported as inconsistent. Monitoring and evaluation systems exist but are irregularly implemented and rarely communicated publicly, limiting their utility for learning and accountability. Transparency mechanisms were also found to be largely procedural rather than functional, with limited accessibility and comprehensibility of financial information. These findings align with Agency Theory, where information asymmetry between officials (agents) and citizens (principals) undermines effective oversight. Limited stakeholder engagement further weakens participatory accountability, as community involvement in decision-making remains low.

Table 2: Summary of Accountability Framework Elements

Element	Status (Perception)	Key Limitation
Oversight structures	Established	Weak coordination, limited capacity
Financial management	Structured	Inconsistent expenditure monitoring
Monitoring & evaluation	Present	Irregular implementation, weak follow-up
Transparency	Moderate	Limited access and clarity
Stakeholder engagement	Low-moderate	Limited participation
Role distribution	Defined	Weak coordination

Source: Research Data, 2026

Table 2 summarizes that although all accountability components are institutionally established, their operational effectiveness is limited by gaps in coordination, monitoring, participation, and information accessibility.

4.2 Objective 2: Effectiveness of accountability framework on service delivery

Survey results indicate moderate effectiveness across accountability dimensions (mean scores ranging from 3.50 to 3.62). Financial management recorded the highest mean (3.62), followed by M&E (3.54), service delivery (3.51), and transparency (3.50).

Table 3: Mean Scores of Key Variables

Variable	Mean Score	Interpretation
Financial Management	3.62	Strong agreement
Monitoring & Evaluation	3.54	Moderate agreement
Transparency	3.50	Moderate agreement
Service Delivery Outcomes	3.51	Moderate agreement

Source: Research Data, 2026

Table 3 indicates that respondents showed strong agreement that effective financial management improves service quality, while perceptions of transparency and M&E effectiveness were more mixed.

Regression analysis

Table 4: Model Summary – Multiple Regression Analysis

Model	R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.728	0.53	0.518	0.412

Source: Research data, 2026.

Multiple regression analysis in Table 4 revealed that accountability mechanisms significantly predict service delivery outcomes ($R^2 = 0.53, p < 0.001$), indicating that 53% of the variation in service delivery is explained by transparency, financial management, and M&E.

Table 5: ANOVA – Regression Model Significance

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	31.84	3	10.61	62.56	0.001
Residual	28.18	140	0.201		
Total	60.02	143			

Source: Research data, 2026.

The regression model is expressed as $Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + e$, where service delivery (SD) is predicted by transparency (T), financial management (FM), and monitoring and evaluation (M&E), with e representing the error term.

According to table 5.the ANOVA results indicate that the regression model is statistically significant ($F = 62.56, p < 0.001$), meaning that the combination of transparency, financial management, and monitoring & evaluation reliably predicts service delivery outcomes

Table 6: Regression Results

Predictor	β Coefficient	Significance
Financial Management	0.44	p < 0.001
Monitoring & Evaluation	0.29	p < 0.01
Transparency	0.21	p < 0.01

Source: Research data, 2026.

Financial management emerged as the strongest predictor as depicted in Table 6, highlighting its central role in translating resources into development outcomes. This supports empirical literature emphasizing the importance of public financial management systems in service delivery.

Monitoring and evaluation also significantly influence outcomes, though qualitative findings indicate that weak enforcement and irregular implementation limit its effectiveness. Transparency, while significant, had the weakest effect, indicating that information disclosure alone is insufficient without citizen capacity to utilize it consistent with the concept of functional transparency.

Comparative Analysis

Kanyama constituency recorded significantly higher mean scores across all variables compared to Chawama (p < 0.05), indicating stronger perceived accountability and service delivery outcomes.

Table 7: Comparative Analysis by Constituency

Variable	Chawama Mean	Kanyama Mean	Sig.
Financial Management	3.42	3.68	.022
Monitoring & Evaluation	3.30	3.55	.042
Transparency	3.18	3.40	.050
Service Delivery	3.25	3.60	.009

Source: Research data, 2026.

Table 7 shows that Kanyama constituency recorded higher mean scores across all variables compared to Chawama, with statistically significant differences.

Objective 3: Challenges affecting CDF management and Proposed Solutions

The results presented in Table 8 addresses Objective 3, by critically analyzing the challenges affecting CDF management and delineating the proposed solutions within the study’s framework.

Table 8: Challenges Affecting CDF Management

Stakeholder Perception	Verbatim Response
Theme: Political Interference	
Political influence compromises fairness and transparency in project selection, with technical criteria often sidelined.	"Politicians sometimes prioritize projects that favor certain groups or wards... This affects fairness and transparency because technical criteria may be overlooked." (Informant 11)
Theme: Limited Training and Capacity of Committees	
Oversight committees lack technical knowledge in budgeting and procurement, reducing their ability to enforce accountability.	"Local committees do not always understand financial management or reporting requirements... Many members are community representatives without formal training." (Informant 18)
Theme: Poor Financial Management – Record Keeping, Reporting & Procurement	
Weak documentation, delayed reporting, and inconsistent procurement practices undermine accountability and create opportunities for manipulation.	"Sometimes you cannot even confirm who received bursaries because the records are incomplete or missing." (Respondent 05) "Financial reports are supposed to be shared regularly, but in most cases, they are delayed or only kept by a few individuals." (Informant 07) "Procurement procedures are supposed to follow clear guidelines, but in practice they are not always followed... contracts are made based on political affiliation or other connections." (Informant 11)
Theme: Weak Monitoring and Enforcement	
Oversight is reactive rather than proactive, with audits infrequent, allowing misuse to go undetected.	"Audits and inspections are infrequent, making it easy for misuse to go undetected. Sometimes monitoring is conducted only after complaints arise." (Informant 10)

Source: Research data, 2026.

The responses reveal that accountability in CDF management is challenged by political interference, limited committee capacity, poor financial management and weak monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.

These structural and operational constraints were perceived to undermine fairness, transparency, and effective oversight thereby reducing the effectiveness of existing accountability frameworks

Proposed Solutions

Table 9: Proposed Solutions

Proposed Solution	Verbatim Response
Challenge: Limited Training and Capacity of Committees	
Capacity-building and regular training workshops to equip committees with technical skills in procurement, financial reporting, and oversight.	"Regular training workshops for committee members would improve their understanding of procurement procedures, financial reporting, and monitoring responsibilities." (Informant 07)
Challenge: Poor Financial Management – Record Keeping, Reporting & Procurement	
Enhanced financial management practices, including results-based financing, to ensure funds are released only upon verified project completion.	"Funds would only be released when projects are completed... verified by an independent committee." (Informant 16)
Challenge: Weak Monitoring and Enforcement	
Stronger enforcement through frequent independent audits and consistent sanctions to deter misuse and restore public trust.	"Frequent independent audits and strict enforcement of guidelines will deter misuse and increase public trust." (Informant 04)

In direct response, stakeholders proposed solutions that mirror these gaps as presented in Table 9: enhancing transparency to counter political influence, building committee capacity to strengthen oversight, improving financial management through results-based practices, and reinforcing monitoring with independent audits and stricter enforcement. Together, these perspectives highlight a coherent pathway from diagnosing accountability failures to recommending practical reforms aimed at restoring trust and improving service delivery.

5. Discussion of Findings

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the study findings in relation to the research objectives, questions, and existing literature on accountability and decentralized public resource management. The analysis integrates quantitative and qualitative results and interprets them using Agency Theory, Governance Theory, and Accountability Theory.

Agency Theory explains principal-agent relationships between citizens and public officials; Governance Theory emphasizes institutional arrangements and participation; and Accountability Theory focuses on transparency, answerability, and enforcement mechanisms (Bovens et al., 2021). Collectively, these frameworks explain how accountability mechanisms influence service delivery in decentralized systems such as the Constituency Development Fund (CDF).

Empirical literature across Africa shows that accountability, transparency, and participation significantly affect local development outcomes (Faguet, 2022; Smoke, 2022). In Zambia, while the expanded CDF has improved local development opportunities, concerns remain regarding governance capacity, transparency, and monitoring effectiveness.

5.2 Accountability Framework in CDF Management

Stakeholders generally view the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) accountability framework as well-established on paper, but uneven in practice. While six key elements i.e. oversight structures, financial management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), transparency, stakeholder engagement, and role distribution, are clearly identifiable, their effectiveness is often limited by weak enforcement, resource constraints, and low levels of participation.

Oversight structures involving Members of Parliament, CDF Committees, Ward Development Committees, and council officials are widely acknowledged as central to the framework. However, their functionality is frequently weakened by irregular meetings and limited technical capacity. This reflects the argument within Accountability Theory that formal institutional arrangements, in themselves, do not guarantee accountability without consistent enforcement and active oversight (Bovens et al., 2021; Ayee, 2020).

Similarly, financial management processes are perceived as relatively structured during the planning and budgeting stages, but less consistent when it comes to tracking expenditure. This gap raises concerns about effective utilization of funds, reinforcing existing evidence that strong expenditure monitoring is essential for improved service delivery outcomes (Andriyansah, 2021; Auditor General of Zambia, 2023, 2024).

Monitoring and evaluation systems are reportedly in place, yet their application is irregular and findings are seldom shared widely. As a result, their potential to support learning and strengthen accountability remains underutilized. This aligns with studies suggesting that weak monitoring systems often limit the overall impact of development interventions (Muyaloka & Kachamba, 2024; Fox, 2022).

Transparency, while present in procedural terms, appears largely confined to formal reporting requirements, with limited effort to present information in ways that are accessible to the public. This situation reflects concerns raised in Agency Theory regarding information asymmetry between public officials and citizens (Keefer & Khemani, 2009; Afrobarometer, 2022).

Stakeholder engagement is widely recognized as an important component of the framework, but in practice it is characterized by infrequent interactions and low participation levels. In many cases, engagement appears more symbolic than substantive, offering limited opportunity for meaningful citizen influence (Matipa, 2019; Lubinga & Chibomba, 2026; Akwalu & Muchai, 2020).

Finally, although roles and responsibilities among key actors, such as MPs, Ward Development Committees, council officials, and CDF Committees, are theoretically well defined, coordination remains weak. This often results in delays, overlaps, and gaps in implementation and monitoring, reflecting broader governance challenges commonly observed in decentralized systems (Thomas & Makwai, 2022; Liswaniso & Chisala, 2026).

Overall, the accountability framework is perceived as more form than substance, with irregular oversight, weak financial monitoring, procedural transparency, and limited participation undermining its effectiveness. These findings align with broader literature emphasizing that accountability outcomes depend not only on formal frameworks but also on enforcement, institutional capacity, and citizen engagement (Kaira & Kajoba, 2025; Mwanangombe & Haabazoka, 2025).

5.3 Effectiveness of Accountability Mechanisms on Service Delivery

The findings demonstrate that accountability mechanisms under the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) significantly influence service delivery outcomes,

albeit with varying degrees of effectiveness. Financial management emerges as the most powerful determinant ($\beta = 0.44$), followed by monitoring and evaluation ($\beta = 0.29$), and transparency ($\beta = 0.21$). This hierarchy suggests that accountability in decentralized development contexts is primarily driven by fiscal control systems rather than information disclosure or oversight structures alone.

5.3.1 Financial Management

Financial management is the strongest predictor of service delivery, underscoring its centrality in translating public resources into development outcomes. Empirical evidence from this study confirms that effective budgeting, procurement oversight, and timely disbursement are directly associated with improved infrastructure delivery and service performance. This aligns with broader public financial management literature, which emphasizes that robust financial systems enhance efficiency and reduce wastage in public programmes (Pierre & Peters, 2021).

However, the effectiveness of financial management in the CDF context is constrained by systemic inefficiencies such as delayed disbursements, weak internal controls, and procurement irregularities, consistent with findings across sub-Saharan Africa (Smoke, 2022; Transparency International Zambia, 2020–2024). The Auditor General's reports further substantiate persistent inconsistencies in fund utilization and compliance failures, reinforcing concerns about weak fiduciary governance.

From a theoretical standpoint, performance based accountability explains these outcomes by arguing that linking disbursements to verified outputs enhances accountability and performance incentives (Fritsche et al., 2014). Similarly, Agency Theory highlights structural tensions between principals and agents, where weak financial oversight enables opportunistic behaviour and misalignment between community needs and implementation decisions. Together, these perspectives suggest that financial management is not merely procedural but fundamentally constitutive of accountability effectiveness.

5.3.2 Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) represent the second most significant mechanism influencing service delivery, serving as a feedback system for correcting implementation gaps.

However, despite its institutional presence, M&E remains inconsistently applied and weakly enforced, limiting its functional impact.

This finding is consistent with decentralization studies showing that formal accountability structures often fail due to weak implementation capacity and institutional fragility (Yu Keping, 2021; Zimkhitha Khene et al., 2021). In the CDF context, oversight committees frequently operate reactively rather than proactively, undermining early detection of inefficiencies.

Empirical explains this gap by emphasizing that formal rules and structures do not automatically translate into effective practice; institutional performance depends on capacity, autonomy, and enforcement authority (Scott, 2014). The observed weaknesses in M&E therefore reflect not design failure but implementation deficits, including limited technical capacity, resource constraints, and political interference.

Consequently, while M&E contributes positively to service delivery, its impact remains moderate due to weak institutionalization.

5.3.3 Transparency

Transparency exerts the weakest but still statistically significant effect on service delivery, indicating that information disclosure alone is insufficient to drive substantive improvements. Although CDF budgets and reports are formally accessible, they are often delayed, technical, and not citizen-friendly.

This supports the concept of functional transparency, which emphasizes that disclosure must be timely, accessible, and usable to enable accountability (Fox, 2007; Grönlund et al., 2021). Without these attributes, transparency becomes symbolic rather than transformative.

Empirical evidence from African governance systems confirms that transparency improves service delivery only when coupled with civic capacity and engagement mechanisms (Bertot et al., 2010; Faguet, 2022). Agency Theory further reinforces this argument by highlighting that accountability depends on informed principals; when citizens cannot interpret information, oversight capacity is weakened.

Thus, transparency in isolation has limited explanatory power in improving service delivery outcomes.

5.3.4 Synthesis of Mechanisms

Collectively, the three mechanisms reinforce each other but operate unevenly. Financial management provides the strongest structural foundation for accountability, while M&E functions as a corrective mechanism and transparency serves as an enabling condition.

5.4 Challenges Affecting CDF Management

Despite the presence of accountability mechanisms, several structural and governance-related constraints undermine effective CDF implementation. The most prominent challenges include weak financial governance, political interference, limited technical capacity, and ineffective monitoring systems.

Financial mismanagement, manifested through procurement irregularities, delayed fund utilization, and weak compliance, remains the most persistent constraint. These weaknesses reinforce Agency Theory's prediction that principal-agent relationships in decentralized systems are prone to opportunism when oversight is weak.

Political interference further distorts resource allocation, often prioritizing political visibility over community needs. This undermines equity and weakens developmental effectiveness, consistent with findings in decentralized governance literature where political economy factors shape implementation outcomes (Smoke, 2022) which is consistent with Agency Theory's principal-agent conflict.

In addition, limited technical capacity among oversight committees constrains the operationalization of accountability systems. Weak skills in financial analysis, monitoring, and reporting reduce enforcement capacity, while fragmented institutional coordination further limits responsiveness.

Overall, these challenges indicate that accountability mechanisms in the CDF system are structurally present but functionally constrained. Their effectiveness is therefore contingent not only on design but on institutional capacity, political neutrality, and enforcement strength.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusion

This study examined the effectiveness of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) accountability framework on service delivery in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies of Lusaka, Zambia.

The findings demonstrate that the CDF accountability system is structured around key mechanisms, including oversight mechanisms, transparency processes, financial management practices, monitoring and evaluation systems and stakeholder engagement. The study focusing on three of these key elements, financial management practices, monitoring and evaluation systems, revealed that collectively, these mechanisms have a significant influence on service delivery outcomes, though their effectiveness varies in practice due to institutional and operational constraints.

The study concludes that financial management practices constitute the strongest driver of improved service delivery, followed by monitoring and evaluation and then transparency. Effective budgeting, fund allocation and financial controls were found to enhance infrastructure delivery and service quality. However, challenges such as delayed fund disbursement, weak procurement oversight and limited financial documentation reduce efficiency in implementation. Monitoring and evaluation systems, although formally established, were found to be inconsistently applied, often constrained by limited capacity, weak enforcement and inadequate resources. Transparency mechanisms, while present, are undermined by delays in information dissemination, technical reporting formats and limited public accessibility.

Despite the existence of formal accountability structures, the study identifies persistent governance challenges including political interference, weak coordination among stakeholders, limited technical capacity of oversight committees and inadequate enforcement of audit recommendations. These factors collectively weaken the effectiveness of the accountability framework and reduce its impact on service delivery outcomes.

The study concludes that improving CDF performance requires strengthening institutional capacity, enhancing transparency through accessible public reporting, institutionalizing regular monitoring systems, and reducing political interference in project selection and implementation

The study concludes that accountability framework in CDF management remains largely procedural, existing more in form than in substantive practice, as implementation gaps and weak enforcement undermine its intended effectiveness. This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the combined effect of accountability mechanisms in urban constituencies, specifically highlighting how transparency, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, and independent audits interact to influence service delivery outcomes.

From a theoretical perspective, the study reinforces Agency Theory, Governance Theory and Accountability Theory by demonstrating that effective public resource management depends not only on formal structures but also on enforcement capacity, information symmetry and institutional coordination.

6.2 Recommendations

The study recommends the following:

RO1: Key elements that constitute the accountability framework in the management of CDF

- The Ministry responsible for Local Government, working with local authorities, MPs, CDF Committees, Ward Development Committees, council officials, and civil society organizations, should establish and institutionalize an integrated, performance-driven CDF accountability system that strengthens awareness and operationalization of oversight, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, transparency, stakeholder engagement, and coordination.

Objective Two: Effectiveness of the accountability framework on service delivery in Constituency Development Fund

- Strengthened financial management systems, including results-based financing approaches requiring the Ministry of Finance to establish frameworks, local authorities to enforce compliance, and the Auditor General's Office to verify outputs before disbursement.

- Increased transparency and public access to information through simplified reporting and mandatory public disclosure of budgets, procurement decisions, and project progress, implemented by local authorities and councils to operationalize disclosure, government ministries to set policy frameworks, and civil society organizations to monitor and disseminate information
- Local Authorities and CDF Committees, under MLGRD oversight, should institutionalize structured monitoring schedules, standardized templates, and periodic reviews to ensure evidence-based decision-making and timely corrective action.

Objective Three: Challenges affecting the management of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Chawama and Kanyama constituencies

- Strengthened Independent audits and enforcement mechanisms to deter misuse of funds, carried out by independent audit bodies such as civil society organizations, regular independent audits, government ministries enforcing sanctions, and local authorities ensuring compliance at constituency level.
- MLGRD and Parliament should reinforce institutional and legal safeguards to reduce political interference, ensuring project selection is guided by objective development criteria and community priorities.
- Enhanced Capacity-building for local committees in procurement, financial reporting, and monitoring practices with the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development designing training programs, local authorities coordinating implementation, and CDF oversight committees applying the acquired skills.

6.3 Limitations and Future Research

This study was limited to two constituencies in Lusaka (Chawama and Kanyama), which constrains the generalizability of findings across Zambia. Its cross-sectional design restricts insights into the long-term sustainability of accountability reforms, while reliance on stakeholder perceptions may introduce bias in evaluating effectiveness. Future research should therefore adopt comparative designs across multiple constituencies and provinces to capture regional disparities,

and longitudinal studies to assess the durability of reforms over time. Further investigation into digital governance tools, such as e-platforms and financial technologies, could illuminate new pathways for enhancing transparency, monitoring, and citizen engagement. Studies on citizen perceptions and participation would deepen understanding of how community oversight influences accountability outcomes. Political economy analyses are needed to assess the extent of political influence in CDF processes and strategies to mitigate distortions, while expanded assessments of accountability components, including roles, coordination, and enforcement mechanisms, would provide a more holistic picture of CDF governance.

Author acknowledgement

The author extends sincere appreciation to all study participants from Chawama and Kanyama constituencies who generously provided their time, insights and cooperation during data collection. Their contributions were instrumental in shaping the findings of this study. Special acknowledgment is also extended to the academic supervisor, Prof. Bupe Getrude Mutono-Mwanza, for her continuous guidance, intellectual input and supervision throughout the research process.

References

1. Afrobarometer. (2022). Accountability and the role of civil society in Africa. Available at: <https://afrobarometer.org> (Accessed: 21 August 2025).
2. Andriyansah, A. (2021). Analysis of financial performance using budget absorption indicators. *Budapest International Research and Critics Institute (BIRCI) Journal: Humanities and Social Sciences*, 4(1), 636-647. <https://doi.org/10.33258/BIRCI.V4I1.1775>
3. Auditor General of Zambia. (2023). *Annual report on the accounts of the Republic*. Lusaka: Government Printer.
4. Auditor General of Zambia. (2024). *Annual report of the Auditor General on the accounts of the Constituency Development Fund*. Lusaka: Office of the Auditor General.

5. Akwalu, J.N., & Muchai, S. (2020). Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and its effects on community welfare in Tigania East Constituency, Meru County, Kenya. *Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development*, 5, 12–35. <https://doi.org/10.47604/jpid.1097>
6. Aye, J.R.A. (2020). Decentralization and accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa: An analytical framework. *African Studies Review*, 63(4), 754–772.
7. Baskin, M. (2010). *Constituency development funds as a tool for development*. Centre for International Development.
8. Blair, H. (2017). Constituency development funds in India. *Economic & Political Weekly*, 52(31), 99.
9. Bovens, M., Goodin, R.E., & Schillemans, T. (2021). *The Oxford handbook of public accountability*. (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3(2), 77–101. <https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa>
11. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. (2016). *Handbook on constituency development funds (CDFs): Principles and tools for parliamentarians*. London: CPA.
12. Creswell, J.W. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
13. Fox, J. (2022). Social accountability: What does the evidence really say? *World Development*, 150, 105711. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105711>
14. Hapompwe, C.C., Tembo, M.N., Kukano, C., & Siwale, J. (2020). An investigation into the impact of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) on rural development with special reference to education and health sectors in Rufunsa Constituency. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, 10(6), 388.
15. Kaira, J., & Kajoba, G. (2025). Constituency Development Fund (CDF) as a tool for infrastructure development in the context of decentralization and devolution in Zambia: A case study of Kabwe Central Constituency. *Social Sciences*, 14, 233–251. <https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20251403.15>
16. Keefer, P., & Khemani, S. (2009). When do legislators pass on “pork”? The determinants of legislator utilization of a constituency development fund in India. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4929*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
17. Liswaniso, M., & Chisala, B. (2026). Assessing the effectiveness of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) implementation strategies on community development outcomes in Chawama Constituency, Zambia: A case study of Lusaka District. *International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology*, 11(2), 3092–3102.
18. Lubinga, B.H., & Chibomba, K. (2026). Examining citizen engagement in participatory constituency development funds: Case study of the Mbala CDF Municipal Council. *International Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Research Studies*, 6, 393–402. <https://doi.org/10.62225/2583049x.2026.6.1.5564>
19. Malik, R. (2021). (A)political constituency development funds: Evidence from Pakistan. *British Journal of Political Science*, 51(3), 963–980. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000541>
20. Matipa, B. (2019). The extent of community participation in Constituency Development Fund (CDF) project identification in Mwense Constituency. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 43, 668–681. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2019.1645686>
21. Muyaloka, D., & Kachamba, N. (2024). Assessing factors influencing the failure of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) projects in education and health sectors in Zambia: A critical analysis. *African Journal of Commerce Studies*, 4, 225–251. <https://doi.org/10.59413/ajocs/v4.i3.6>
22. Mwanangombe, E., & Haabazoka, L. (2025). The effects of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) on education sector growth: The case of Luano District, Zambia. *International Journal of Novel Research and Development*, 10, 948–964.
23. Ndalamei, A.S., & Phiri, J. (2026). Analysing the effectiveness of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) on youth empowerment in Zambia: A case of Lusaka Central Constituency. *African Journal of Commerce Studies*, 7, 352–371. <https://doi.org/10.59413/ajocs/v7.i2.31>
24. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2020). *Enhancing public sector accountability*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

25. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2021). *Building trust and reinforcing democracy*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

26. Smoke, P. (2015). Rethinking decentralization: Assessing challenges to a popular public sector reform. *Public Administration and Development*, 35(2), 97-112. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1703>

27. Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (2003). *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

28. Thomas, P.S., & Makwai, A.I. (2022). Community participation in the Constituency Development Catalyst Fund: A case of Bahi District, Tanzania. *East African Journal of Management and Business Studies*, 2. <https://doi.org/10.46606/eajmbs2022v02i03.0011>

29. Transparency International Zambia. (2025). *Public accountability and Constituency Development Fund report*. Lusaka: TI-Z.

30. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2022). *Governance for resilient development*. New York: UNDP.

31. Wampler, B. (2022). Participatory budgeting in global perspective. In Wampler, B., McNulty, S., & Touchton, M. (Eds.), *Participatory budgeting in global perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

32. World Bank. (2020). *Enhancing government effectiveness and transparency*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

33. World Bank. (2023). *Zambia public expenditure review*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

34. Yamane, T. (1967). *Statistics: An introductory analysis*. (2nd ed.). New York: Harper & Row.

35. Zyl, A.V. (2010). What is wrong with the constituency development funds? *International Budget Partnership*. Available at: <https://www.internationalbudget.org>

Disclaimer / Publisher's Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of Journals and/or the editor(s). Journals and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.